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This study is published within a se-
ries of policy briefs on Europe and 
its neighbours in the east and 
south. In this series we publish pa-
pers commissioned or produced by 
the Bertelsmann Stiftung in cooper-
ation with regional partners in the 
framework of our work in this field 
This policy brief is the product of 
the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s cooper-
ation with the Warsaw-based Insti-
tute of Public Affairs (ISP). 
 
The narrative of two Ukraines – the 
existence of two separate cultural-
political communities within one 
Ukrainian state – has accompanied 
the relatively short history of inde-
pendent Ukraine from the very be-
ginning. Articulated by Mykola 
Ryabchuk more than twenty years 
ago1 and seemingly logical and 
reasonable, it has become the fa-
vourite narrative of many Ukrainian 
and international commentators 
and analysts. One of these 
Ukraines is pro-European, shares 
liberal democracy values, wants to 
join the European Union, “return to 
Europe” and, what is very im-
portant, speaks Ukrainian. The 
symbolic centre of this Ukraine is 
Lviv. The other is nostalgic about 
the Soviet Union, has close rela-
tions with contemporary Russia, is 
hostile towards the West and does 
not share “western” values. The 
language of this other Ukraine is 
Russian and its “capital” is Do-
netsk. Taking on board this narra-
tive simply means equating one’s 
                                                          
1 M. Ryabczuk, Two Ukraines?, East European 
Reporter, vol. 5, no. 4, 1992. 
2 M. Ryabczuk, Ukraine: One State, Two Coun-
tries? With Comments, Institute for Human Sci-
region of residence, political views, 
and preferred language.  
 
Ryabchuk himself already repudi-
ated this simplistic account some 
time ago.2 However, the tale of two 
Ukraines is still very popular and of-
ten uncritically reiterated and ex-
ploited in political games. One 
could watch its new version after 
the eruption of protests against the 
suspension of signing of the asso-
ciation agreement with the EU by 
former president Yanukovych. 
Many commentators presented the 
battle for Maidan as a conflict be-
tween the Russian-speaking East 
and Ukrainian-speaking West. Cur-
rently, the same narrative is em-
ployed by president Putin, who jus-
tifies his intervention in Ukraine by 
the need to protect the “Russian-
speaking” population against the 
allegedly nationalistic Ukrainian-
speaking government and its chau-
vinistic supporters.  
 
The tale of two Ukraines equates 
language, national identity, region 
of residence, and political orienta-
tion of all Ukrainian citizens. The 
available empirical data, presented 
in the text, demonstrates that there 
are indeed some correlations be-
tween the preferred language, re-
gion of residence, and political 
views, the perceptions of the neigh-
bouring states as well as prefer-
ences as to the future of their coun-
try. However, the situation is far 
from being as unambiguous and 
ences, available at: http://www.iwm.at/read-lis-
ten-watch/transit-online/ukraine-one-state-two-
countries/, accessed on March 10, 2014 
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unequivocal as the narrative of two 
Ukraines would suggest. Although 
the political attitudes of the popula-
tions of Lviv and Donetsk differ, it 
does not imply that the preferred 
language determines ethnic/na-
tional identity or geopolitical 
choices. The language situation is 
exceptionally complex, and the 
boundaries along which the linguis-
tic dividing lines run are very 
blurred. What follows, the tale of 
two Ukraines, even though catchy 
and attractive, does not reflect the 
real diversity (linguistic, ethnic, or 
political) of Ukrainian society. It 
cannot justify the claim for the divi-
sion or even federalisation of the 
Ukrainian state. What is more, irre-
spective of the region of residence, 
the majority of the population of 
Ukraine is sceptical of any divi-
sions, including federalisation, of 
their country and believe that 
Ukraine is their only home country. 
 
Language preference, region of 
residence, and national identity 
 
The claim about two Ukraines can 
be easily invalidated by juxtaposing 
declarations about national iden-
tity, mother tongue, and the lan-
guage used in everyday situations. 
These indicators are very differ-
ently distributed. A considerably 
larger percentage of the Ukrainian 
population speaks Russian than 
claims Russian identity. In other 
words, a large share of people who 
identify themselves as ethnic 
Ukrainians are Russophones.  
 
An analysis of the empirical data, 
indeed, illustrates certain tenden-
cies: a larger share of “easterners” 
speak Russian, and “westerners” – 
Ukrainian. Yet, the linguistic situa-
tion is more complex. Depending 
on how the question about the lan-
guage is worded we can even 
sometimes get diametrically differ-
ent answers. What is more, the 
majority of Ukrainians are at 
least passively bilingual – even if 
they do not use one of the lan-
guages in everyday situations, 
they understand it perfectly well. It 
is not infrequent that while having a 
conversation, one person speaks 
Ukrainian and the other – Russian. 
Besides, especially in central 
Ukraine, many people speak so-
called “surzhik”, a combination of 
Russian and Ukrainian. Yet, when 
asked about their reliance on 
surzhik, people may deny it and 
claim that they actually speak ei-
ther Russian or Ukrainian.  
According to census results (2001), 
68% claim that their mother tongue 
is Ukrainian and 30% – Russian. 
There are also considerable re-
gional differences. In Lviv Oblast, 
for example, as many as 95% con-
sider Ukrainian as their native lan-
guage, whereas in Donetsk Oblast 
the figure is only 24%. Notably, 
72% of the residents of the capital 
claim that their mother tongue is 
Ukrainian and only 25% that it is 
Russian.  
 
Yet, when we ask about the lan-
guage that respondents find easier 
to speak, the situation is somewhat 
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different, and in Kyiv it is diametri-
cally different. When we compare 
the census results and opinion 
polls, it turns out that a considera-
ble share of Ukrainians consider 
Ukrainian their mother tongue, yet 
claim it is easier for them to speak 
Russian. 
 
Graph 1. Language preferences of 
Ukrainians* 
 
*The question was: “What language is it 
easier for you to communicate in?” 
Source: IPA opinion poll results, 20133 
 
What is more, when respondents 
were given more options, the lin-
guistic situation looks even more 
complicated. Except for the west of 
Ukraine, about 10% of the Ukrain-
ian population admit speaking 
surzhik, and about 20% claim that 
they speak both Russian and 
Ukrainian at home, depending on 
the situation. It is also noteworthy 
that Russian is usually the pre-
                                                          
3 The opinion poll was conducted by GfK 
through telephone interviews on a sample of 
1,000 adult respondents in June 2013. An addi-
tional 300 interviews were conducted in West-
ern Ukraine in order to better analyse the atti-
tudes of the inhabitants of this region. The anal-
ferred language of ethnic minori-
ties. For example, Crimean Tartars 
predominantly speak Russian in 
everyday situations. 
 
Graph 2. Language used in everyday 
conversations at home 
 
Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 
 
The research results demonstrate 
that the preferred language is not 
equivalent to ethnic identity, which 
is particularly clear in the case of 
the population in the east and south 
of Ukraine. The juxtaposition of the 
poll results regarding language and 
ethnic identity demonstrates that a 
considerable share of people who 
prefer to use Russian in everyday 
life consider themselves Ukrainian. 
In the east, 72% claim to be Ukrain-
ian, yet only 6% claim that it is eas-
ier for them to speak Ukrainian. 
ysis of the results was published as a report en-
titled “Poland – Ukraine, Poles – Ukrainians. A 
Look Across the Border”, Joanna Fomina, Jo-
anna Konieczna-Sałamatin, Jacek Kucharczyk, 
Łukasz Wenerski, IPA, Warsaw, 2013, available 
at: http://www.isp.org.pl/publikacje,25,638.html 
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The situation in the south of the 
country looks similar.  
 
Graph 3. Declared nationality – regional 
differences 
 
Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 
 
Notwithstanding any linguistic, po-
litical, or cultural differences, the 
vast majority of Ukrainians con-
sider Ukraine their motherland. 
Even in the south of the country, 
88% believe that Ukraine is their 
home country. This conviction is 
even more popular among resi-
dents of the allegedly pro-Russian 
east – 93% share this belief, in 
comparison to the traditionally pat-
riotic west and centre (99%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4. Do you consider Ukraine your 
motherland? 
 
Source: Razumkov Centre, opinion poll re-
sults, 2013 
 
What is more, a dominating major-
ity of Ukrainians demonstrate patri-
otic feelings for Ukraine. Only 18% 
in the south and 15% in the east do 
not consider themselves patriots of 
Ukraine. 
 
Graph 5. Do you consider yourself a 
patriot of Ukraine? 
 
Source: Razumkov Centre, opinion poll re-
sults, 2013 
 
In other words, even people who 
prefer speaking Russian and/or live 
in the east or south of the country 
still predominantly consider 
Ukraine their motherland and have 
patriotic feelings for their country. 
 8 
L
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
, 
Id
e
n
tit
y
, 
P
o
lit
ic
s
 -
 t
h
e
 M
y
th
 o
f 
T
w
o
 U
k
ra
in
e
s
  
P
o
lic
y
 B
ri
e
f 
 
 
There are some correlations be-
tween language preferences and 
region of residence on the one 
hand, and national identity and pat-
riotism on the other, yet the results 
by no means justify the “two 
Ukraines” theory . 
 
Language and values and atti-
tudes towards democracy 
 
According to the two Ukraines nar-
rative, the Ukrainian-speaking pop-
ulation of Ukraine shares demo-
cratic values, and supports reforms 
strengthening civic freedoms and 
political rights, whereas the Rus-
sian-speakers are nostalgic about 
the Soviet Union and do not mind 
strong and centralised (authoritar-
ian) rule. Does such a division exist 
in real life? We can check this on 
the basis of the results of the sixth 
edition of the World Value Survey – 
an opinion poll conducted in 
Ukraine in 2011 and 2012, i.e. dur-
ing the presidency of Viktor Yanu-
kovych. 
 
The respondents were asked to as-
sess on the scale of 0 to 10 the im-
portance of living in a democratic 
state. They were also asked about 
the level of satisfaction about the 
performance of democracy in their 
own country. The results demon-
strate that there are no significant 
differences between Russian- and 
Ukrainian-speakers regarding de-
mocracy. The majority of Ukraini-
ans attached considerable im-
portance to living in a democrati-
cally governed state and were very 
critical of the situation regarding 
democracy in their own country, ir-
respective of whether they were 
Russophones or Ukrophones.  
 
Graph 6. Opinions on democracy as a 
principle and as practice* 
 
*The respondents were asked to assess 
the importance of living in a democratic 
state as well as satisfaction with the per-
formance of democracy in their own state 
on a scale of 0 to 10. 
 
Source: World Values Survey: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/  
 
The respondents were also asked 
about their support for democratic 
and authoritarian forms of govern-
ment. The juxtaposition of the re-
sults demonstrates the internal di-
lemma of Ukrainians who on one 
hand want to live in a democrati-
cally governed state, yet on the 
other – long for a single strong 
leader who will put their country in 
order. Yet, the difficulty in choosing 
either a democratic or an authori-
tarian form of governance was 
faced by both Russian and Ukrain-
ian speakers alike. Needless to 
say, it results from dissatisfaction 
with the successive government 
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brought to power as a result of 
(more or less) free elections.  
 
Graph 7. Support for democratic and 
authoritarian forms of governance 
 
Source: World Values Survey: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
 
The views of the Russian- and 
Ukrainian-speaking population of 
Ukraine do not differ considerably 
regarding their trust towards the 
authorities. People who prefer to 
speak Russian in everyday life only 
trusted the government under for-
mer president Yanukovych slightly 
more often – the difference with 
their Ukrainian-speaking fellow citi-
zens was just eight percentage 
points. Slightly fewer people ex-
pressed trust in the parliament, with 
the difference between the two 
groups being just three percentage 
points.  
 
 
 
Graph 8. Confidence in parliament and 
government 
 
Source: World Values Survey: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
 
The claim that Viktor Yanukovych 
and the Party of Regions, although 
disliked by the Ukrainian-speaking 
population, enjoyed widespread 
support and trust from Russian-
speakers is easily refuted on the 
basis of these results. These re-
sults also demonstrate that we 
should not jump to conclusions that 
there are considerable differences 
in political attitudes between peo-
ple according to linguistic dividing 
lines. 
 
Language and region of resi-
dence and geopolitical choices 
of Ukrainians 
 
So-called “multi-vector” orientation 
in terms of geopolitics – assigning 
relatively the same significance to 
relations with the EU and Russia – 
has been characteristic for both 
Ukrainian politics and the attitudes 
of Ukrainian society for the whole 
period of independence. It has al-
ways been difficult for Ukrainians to 
make a decided choice between 
the west and the east. The reasons 
for this state of affairs include the 
geographical position, history, as-
sessments of (unfinished) systemic 
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transformation after regaining inde-
pendence, and the impact of the 
mass media.  
 
The already cited IPA opinion poll 
(2013) demonstrates that the ma-
jority of Ukrainians would like to 
see their country intensively coop-
erating with both the EU and Rus-
sia. The dominant group, 42% of 
respondents, believed that intensi-
fication of relations both with the 
EU and Russia was in the interest 
of their state. However, among 
those who were able to make an 
unequivocal choice between the 
two geopolitical options, the sup-
porters of the EU prevailed. 
Twenty-seven per cent believed 
that closer relations with the EU 
were in the interest of Ukraine, 
whereas the unequivocally Rus-
sian option was chosen by only 
17%.  
 
Graph 9. Opinions on closer 
cooperation with European Union 
 
Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 
Graph 10. Opinions on closer 
cooperation with Russia 
 
Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 
 
The majority of Ukrainians, irre-
spective of the language they 
speak, believed that closer ties with 
both the EU and Russia were im-
portant for the economic develop-
ment of Ukraine. The majority of 
Russian-speakers and Ukrainian-
speakers also believed that inte-
gration with the EU is in the interest 
of Ukraine. What is significant, 
however, is that not only did the 
majority of Russian-speakers be-
lieve that also closer ties with Rus-
sia were in the interest of Ukraine, 
but also almost half of the Ukrain-
ian-speakers.  
 
Thus, the “multi-vector” option was 
the most popular choice among the 
majority of Ukrainians, irrespective 
of the language they speak. Yet, 
when people were asked to make a 
choice between integration with 
Russia and integration with the EU, 
regional differences emerged. Pre-
dictably the west and the centre 
tended to choose the European 
vector of integration, and the east – 
the Russian one. What is signifi-
cant, however, is that the residents 
of the south were divided in their 
opinions regarding geopolitical 
choices of their country – 45% 
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wanted their country to join the EU, 
and 41% – to join the Customs Un-
ion of Russia, Kazakhstan, and 
Belarus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 11. Supporters of the Eastern 
and Western vectors of Ukraine's 
integration – according to the two 
Ukraines claim 
 
Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 
 
 
Graph 12. Supporters of the Eastern 
and Western vectors of Ukraine's 
integration – according to linguistic 
differences 
 
Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 
 
Map 1. Supporters of the Western and Eastern direction of integration – regional 
differences 
 
73% supporters of the accession of Ukraine to the European Union 
41% supporters of the accession of Ukraine to the customs union with Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan 
 
Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 
 
 
supporters of  the ac-
cession  of  Ukraine to 
the European Union 
rs of the accession of 
Ukraine  supporters of  the 
accession of 
Ukraine to the cus-
toms union with 
Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan  
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An interesting tendency can be ob-
served regarding the differences 
between the south-east and the 
centre-west. The latter is much 
more supportive of integration with 
the EU (66%) than the south-east 
is of integration with Russia (49%), 
whereas, irrespective of the pre-
ferred language, a larger share of 
Ukrainians preferred integration 
with the EU – 45% among Russo-
phones and 62% among Ukro-
phones – than with Russia (40% 
and 16%, respectively).  
 
Language and the perception of 
Poland 
 
Poland is often perceived by both 
other EU member-states and its 
eastern neighbours as a country 
that strongly supports the pro-west-
ern and pro-European orientation 
of Ukraine. At the same time, in 
Russian propaganda, Poland is of-
ten presented as a country that is 
trying to forcefully make Ukraine 
join the EU. According to the two 
Ukraines claim, thus, we could ex-
pect that the perception of Poland 
would be different depending on 
the language preferred and the re-
gion of residence of the respond-
ents.  
 
IPA research results demonstrate 
that Poland enjoys a very positive 
perception across Ukrainian soci-
ety. Neither preferred language nor 
region of residence were of signifi-
cance regarding the perception of 
how the Polish state functions. 
Both the population in the east and 
the west believed that the Polish 
government takes good care of its 
citizens and that Poles can fully en-
joy their rights and civil liberties. 
Taking into account that Poland is 
an EU member state most fre-
quently visited by Ukrainians, to a 
certain extent these results can be 
extrapolated to the whole of the 
EU.  
 
Graph 13. Opinions on the situation in 
Poland – regional differences 
 
Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 
 
Graph 14. Opinions on the situation in 
Poland – differences according to 
language preference 
 
Source: IPA opinion poll results, 2013 
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Region of residence and views 
on federalisation and separa-
tism 
 
The narrative about two Ukraines is 
often employed to justify the pro-
posals for the political division of 
Ukraine, either federalisation or a 
split into two separate political enti-
ties, or uniting parts of Ukraine with 
another state (Russia). However, 
public opinion is predominantly 
hostile to any such changes, both 
in the west and in the east. More 
than half of the population in all the 
regions – with 53% in the east be-
ing the lowest score – are critical of 
the idea of the federalisation of 
Ukraine. This goes against the 
grain of popular perceptions about 
the widespread desire of eastern 
Ukrainians to see their region as 
part of a federation rather than the 
unitary state of Ukraine. What is in-
teresting, about 20% (with some re-
gional differences) find it hard to 
answer a question on the federali-
sation of Ukraine. These citizens 
are easy to persuade either one 
way or the other. In addition, many 
may simply want greater decentral-
isation of the state, and not federal-
isation. 
  
Graph 15. Support for the idea of 
Ukraine as a federal state 
 
Source: Razumkov Centre, opinion poll re-
sults, 2013 
 
The idea of splitting Ukraine into 
two states enjoys even less sup-
port. More than 70% of Ukrainians 
in all regions do not support sepa-
rating parts of Ukraine by creating 
a state covering the south-east re-
gions. The greatest difference is 
between the east and the west, 
which is only nine percentage 
points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 16. Support for the idea of 
creating two independent states (the 
south-eastern oblasts vs. the western 
and central oblasts) 
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Source: Razumkov Centre, opinion poll re-
sults, 2013 
 
Separatist tendencies are not pop-
ular in Ukraine, irrespective of the 
region of residence. Only 5% in the 
east and 13% in the south would 
like their oblast to create an inde-
pendent state, separate from 
Ukraine. 
 
Graph 17. Support for separating one’s 
native oblast and creating an 
independent state 
 
Source: Razumkov Centre, opinion poll re-
sults, 2013 
Joining Russia is almost equally 
unpopular. The vast majority of 
Ukrainians, irrespective of how 
close to Russia they live, does not 
want their oblast to join Russia – 
more than 70% in all regions. For-
saking Ukraine for the sake of Rus-
sia is popular among not more than 
14% of the residents of the south-
east. These results are especially 
significant in the face of the 
pseudo-referendum, engineered 
by the Russian authorities in Cri-
mea. 
 
Graph 18. Support for the idea of 
separating the south-eastern regions of 
Ukraine and forcing them to unite with 
Russia? 
 
Source: Razumkov Centre, opinion poll re-
sults, 2013 
 
Finally, despite the fact that the re-
search shows that regional differ-
ences between the east and the 
west are not that significant and do 
not justify the claim about two 
Ukraines, this narrative has be-
come relatively popular also within 
Ukrainian society itself, especially 
in the east and south. One third of 
Ukrainians living in the east and 
south believe that the differences 
between the two parts of Ukraine 
are so significant that they may re-
sult in the division of Ukraine in the 
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future. This conviction is consider-
ably less popular in the centre and 
especially in the west – this opinion 
is shared by 16% and 10%, respec-
tively. It appears that the impact of 
the Russian media is key here to 
understanding these regional dif-
ferences. The Russian media have 
been promoting the idea of the “na-
tionalistic” west that is so different 
from the east of Ukraine. As a re-
sult, the belief in some insurmount-
able differences between the east-
erners and westerners is twice as 
popular in the east as it is in the 
west of Ukraine. Yet, it is significant 
that despite such propaganda, the 
majority of Ukrainians, including 
the east and south, deny that a two-
state solution is possible.  
 
Graph 19. Belief that the split of 
Ukraine is possible due to 
irreconcilable differences between 
regions* 
 
* The question was: “Do you believe in the 
existence of deep political contradictions, 
language and cultural barriers, and eco-
nomic disparity between the citizens of the 
western and eastern regions of Ukraine 
that in future may result in the separation 
of these regions and/or the creation of 
separate independent states on Ukraine’s 
territory, or make those regions unite with 
other states?” 
 
Source: Razumkov Centre, opinion poll re-
sults, 2013 
 
Crimea – poles apart? 
 
Once we have seen that the differ-
ences between the populations of 
the east and the west of Ukraine 
are not that considerable, the ques-
tion arises whether Crimea is poles 
apart from the rest of Ukraine. It is 
often emphasised that Crimea only 
joined Ukraine in the 1950s and 
has never become really Ukrainian 
in spirit. Crimea is also the native 
land of the Crimean Tartars, who 
make up 16% of the peninsula’s 
population, according to the 2001 
census.  
 
The Crimean population, compris-
ing a considerable group of ethnic 
Russians who settled there during 
the communist times as well as 
families of the Black Sea Fleet 
members, is indeed much more fa-
vourably oriented towards Russia 
than towards the EU. According to 
the results of an opinion poll, con-
ducted in Crimea in May 2013, sim-
ilarly to the east of the country, 53% 
of the Crimean population would 
rather see Ukraine join the union 
with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Bel-
arus than the EU (supported by 
17%), if they had to make a single 
choice. It is also noteworthy that 
one third of the population did not 
support any of the two options. 
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Graph 20. Support for joining the 
European Union and the Customs 
Union with Russia* 
 
* The questions was: “If Ukraine was able 
to enter only one international economic 
union, which entity should it be?” 
 
Source: International Republican Institute, 
2013 
 
Yet, as the results of the poll 
demonstrate, the population of Cri-
mea neither felt that Russian 
speakers were in a disadvantaged 
situation, nor the majority wanted 
Crimea to change its country alle-
giance. The official motivation be-
hind Russia’s military intervention 
and the following annexation of Cri-
mea was the protection of its Rus-
sian-speaking population, allegedly 
suffering discrimination under 
Ukrainian rule. However, an opin-
ion poll, conducted in Crimea in 
May 2013, demonstrates that only 
six per cent of the population 
claims that the status of the Rus-
sian language was one of the three 
issues most important to them per-
sonally. 
 
What is more, the majority of the 
Crimean population supported the 
status quo – autonomy within 
Ukraine. Twelve per cent wanted to 
have Crimean Tatar autonomy – 
the percentage is close to the share 
of Crimean Tatars in the population 
of the peninsula, whereas annexa-
tion by Russia was supported by 
less than one-fourth of the popula-
tion.  
 
Graph 21. Opinions on the status of 
Crimea (in %) 
 
Source: International Republican Institute, 
2013 
 
An even more recent opinion poll 
shows that although a rather con-
siderable share of the Crimean 
population would like to see 
Ukraine and Russia join into one 
state, it is not the majority of the 
population. According to the results 
of the poll conducted in February 
2014, several weeks before the ref-
erendum, only 41% believed that 
Russia and Ukraine should unite 
into one state.  
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It is likely that Russian media prop-
aganda has convinced more peo-
ple of the threats following the 
change of central government in 
Ukraine, and thus the support for 
separating Crimea from Ukraine 
and joining Russia has increased. 
Yet, it is hard to believe that Crime-
ans have changed their minds en 
masse within such a short period of 
time – according to the results of 
the Crimean referendum presented 
by the Russian side, more than 
90% voted for joining Russia. 
 
The analysis of the turnout dynam-
ics during the referendum, the re-
sults of earlier opinion polls, the 
fact that Russian citizens were al-
lowed to take part in the referen-
dum, the boycott of the referendum 
by Crimean Tartars (12-16% of the 
population) and the turnout in some 
places exceeded 100%, all point to 
the fact that the results of the refer-
endum have been considerably 
manipulated. What is more, there 
was no space for balanced infor-
mation campaign showing pros and 
cons of joining Russia. The referen-
dum was prepared within three 
weeks during a considerable politi-
cal crisis in the country with the 
presence of Russian troops in the 
peninsula. A referendum under the 
barrel of a Kalashnikov can hardly 
be called free and fair. 
 
All in all, the public opinion poll re-
sults show that Crimea is not signif-
icantly different from the rest of 
Ukraine and even the territorially 
modified version of the two 
Ukraines’ claim is not justified. 
What is more, support for economic 
integration with the Russian-led 
customs union is not tantamount to 
separatist tendencies and the de-
sire to become part of Russia. 
  
Conclusions 
 
It goes without saying that Ukrain-
ian society is diverse in terms of 
language and culture as well as at-
titudes and opinions regarding the 
future of their state. However, all 
explanations based on the divi-
sions according to language prefer-
ences are considerable simplifica-
tions and do not reflect the real sit-
uation, but rather impose precon-
ceived notions, which are largely 
unfair to Ukrainians and dangerous 
in terms of the future of the Ukrain-
ian state. Ukrainians may not agree 
on many issues, yet, Ukrainian so-
ciety does not consist of two mono-
liths or two internally coherent cul-
tural-political communities. There-
fore, the widely-used category of 
“Russian speakers” is largely irrel-
evant as an explanation of socio-
political divisions within Ukrainian 
society. 
 
To sum up: 
 
 Both ethnic Russians and 
Ukrainians often choose to 
speak Russian. Many Ukrain-
ian patriots with strongly pro-
western views may speak Rus-
sian at home and in everyday 
situations.  
 Both Russian- and Ukrainian-
speakers were strongly critical 
of the former president Viktor 
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Yanukovych and the govern-
ment of the Party of Regions. 
 The majority of Ukrainians be-
lieve that close cooperation 
with both the European Union 
and Russia is in the interest of 
their state. Yet, when they 
need to make a single geopo-
litical choice, the majority pre-
fer the European vector of inte-
gration, irrespective of the lan-
guage they speak.  
 Whereas, when people are 
forced to make a single choice 
between European integration 
and the Russia-led customs 
union, regional differences re-
surface. The population in the 
west and centre prefer the EU 
and the east prefers the Rus-
sian model of integration. Pub-
lic opinion in the south is di-
vided.  
 Irrespective of the region of 
residence or the preferred lan-
guage, the majority of Ukraini-
ans would like to live in a dem-
ocratic state. 
 After several of years of Viktor 
Yanukovych’s rule, the major-
ity of Ukrainians, irrespective 
of their preferred language, 
were critical of his presidency 
and the government of the 
Party of Regions.  
 A decisive majority of Ukraini-
ans also have a very positive 
perception of the situation in 
Poland. Irrespective of the pre-
ferred language or region of 
residence, Ukrainians believe 
that the Polish state takes 
good care of its citizens and 
Poles enjoy their rights and 
civil liberties.  
 The majority of Ukrainians, ir-
respective of the language 
they speak or the region they 
live in, do not share separatist 
sentiments. They do not sup-
port either the idea of creating 
two states or separating their 
region or oblast from Ukraine 
and making it independent or 
joining Russia. 
 Support for close economic co-
operation with Russia is not 
tantamount to the desire to join 
the Russian state in any region 
of Ukraine. 
 Even in Crimea, less than one 
quarter of the whole population 
would like to see their region 
join Russia. The majority sup-
ported the status quo – Crimea 
being part of Ukraine and hav-
ing an autonomous status. 
 The overwhelming majority of 
Ukrainians, irrespective of lan-
guage or region of residence, 
consider themselves patriots of 
Ukraine and see Ukraine as 
their motherland. 
 
Dr. Joanna Fomina is a sociologist 
in the European Studies Unit of 
the Polish Academy of Sciences 
and IPA associate expert. 
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